Russell's Method of Analysis by Hager, P
PAUL HAGER 
9 Russell's Method of Analysis 
A major component of Russell's philosophical work was the devel-
opment of a distinctive method of philosophising, which, though 
he consistently applied it throughout his career, has been largely ig-
nored. This lack of understanding of Russell's method has been a 
main cause of the still widespread perception that the progress of his 
philosophy is fragmented and erratic. This chapter will, firstly, out-
line key characteristics of Russell's method of philosophical analysis 
and show how this method underpins a number of his best known 
contributions to philosophy. Secondly, because his philosophical 
writings from the 1920s onwards have been rather neglected, some of 
his work of the late 1940s and early I9SOS will be discussed to show 
that it exemplifies the same basic philosophical method. This will 
have the effect of emphasising the unity and continuity of Russell's 
philosophy. Finally, defective accounts of Russell's philosophy in 
some critical works are traced to misunderstanding of his method 
of analysis. 
RUSSELL'S METHOD OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
Throughout his career Russell adhered to a characteristic view of the 
nature of philosophical analysis according to which it has two parts. 
Firstly, philosophical analysis proceeds backwards from a body of 
knowledge to its premisses, and, secondly, it proceeds forwards from 
the premisses to a reconstruction of the original body of knowledge. 
Russell often called the first stage of philosophical analysis simply 
"analysis", in contrast to the second stage which he called "synthe-
sis" lor, sometimes, "construction"). While the first stage was seen 
as being the most philosophical, both stages were nonetheless essen-
tial to philosophical analysis. It is beyond the scope of this chapter 
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to fully document the claim that Russell consistently adhered to 
this two-directional view of philosophical analysis throughout his 
career; however, a consideration of some representative writings of 
Russell will further clarify his view of philosophical analysis and its 
implications. r 
Russell's initial major applications of his method of philosophi-
cal analysis were to mathematics in Principles of Mathematics and 
Principia Mathematica. So we find in his writings of this period a 
very clear account of philosophical analysis applied to mathematics 
(Hager 1994, Chapter 2). However, he held also that this mathemati-
cal work was, in principle, no different from work in the foundations 
of any science or discipline. Increasingly from the first decade of the 
twentieth century, Russell turned his method of analysis from math-
ematics and logic to other philosophical concerns such as epistemol-
ogy, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. 
In all cases, philosophical analysis was aimed at a non-empirical in-
tellectual discovery of propositions and concepts from which could 
be fashioned premisses for the basic data from which the analysis 
had begun. 
Russell was very specific about the two-directional character of 
his philosophical method: "The business of philosophy, as I conceive 
it, is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthe-
sis" (LA, p. 162). The first or backwards stage, logical analysis, was 
seen as general across all philosophy: 
... every truly philosophical problem is a problem of analysis; and in prob-
lems of analysis the best method is that which sets out from results and 
arrives at the premisses. (Russell 1911, Papers 6, p. 33) 
The second or forwards stage, logical synthesis, was seen as follow-
ing upon and mirroring imperfectly the earlier logical analysis stage: 
When the philosopher's work has been perfectly accomplished, its results 
can be wholly embodied in premisses from which deduction may proceed. 
(POM, p. 129) 
The logical synthesis can only mirror imperfectly the logical analy-
sis stage because it is capable of yielding more than the knowledge 
' For detailed discussion see Hager (1994) for 1900 onwards, while Griffin {1991) 
details the period up to 1900. See also Irvine {1989), and Codwyn and Irvine in this 
volume. 
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(results or data) that was the starting point of the analysis. According 
to Russell(IMP, p. 2), we "shall find that by analysing our ordinary 
mathematical notions we acquire fresh insight, new powers, and the 
means of reaching whole new mathematical subjects by adopting 
fresh lines of advance after our backward journey." This capacity of 
the synthesis stage to expand knowledge needs emphasising since it 
has usually been overlooked. When "we have decided upon our pre-
misses, we have to build up again as much as may seem necessary of 
the data previously analysed, and as many other consequences of our 
premisses as are of sufficient general interest to deserve a statement" 
(PM, vol r, p. v). 
Each of the quotations in the last few paragraphs has been taken 
from a context where Russell was asserting the general features of the 
method of philosophical analysis. Likewise, when summing up his 
career, Russell repeatedly stated that a single method was common 
to all of his philosophical ventures. !See, e.g., HWP, pp. 788- 9 and 
MPD, pp. 98 and 162.) Given this definiteness on Russell's part, the 
relative lack of attention to his method of analysis is puzzling. 
A careful consideration of the wide range of descriptions that 
Russell provides of his method of philosophical analysis points to 
some important characteristics that he repeatedly emphasises: 
i) Analysis is unlikely to be final. 
This applies in several ways. Not only is analysis never final in the 
sense that new premisses may be discovered in relation to which 
existing premisses are results, but there also is the ever present pos-
sibility of alternative sets of premisses for the same results. In the 
former case, further stages of analysis in no way invalidate earlier 
ones. As Russell repeatedly emphasised, no error will flow from tak-
ing complex objects to be simple at one level of analysis, as long as 
it is not assumed that such objects are incapable of further analysis. 
Thus" ... points may be defined as classes of events, but that does 
not falsify anything in traditional geometry, which treated points as 
simples" IHK, p. 269).2 In the latter case, to ask what are the mini-
mum premisses for a given set of results "is a technical question and 
it has no unique answer" (MPD, p. 162). Hence, one important task 
for philosophy is to devise alternative sets of premisses. 
1 See also LA, p. 158 and MPD, pp. r64- 5. 
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However, Russell's use of the terms 'premisses' and 'results' in his 
discussions of analysis does require some comment. Strictly speak-
ing, of course, premisses and results, being components of deductive 
arguments, can only be propositions or statements. However, anal-
ysis leads not only to propositions, but also to concepts or ideas 
which are primitive at one level of analysis and defined at the next 
level down. (See, e.g., IMP, pp. 3-4.) At the higher level these con-
cepts or ideas are used in definitions that provide further premisses. 
When characterizing his method of analysis, Russell sometimes, for 
convenience, uses 'premisses' in a wider sense to refer to concepts 
or ideas, as well as propositions. Take, for instance, Peano's analy-
sis of natural number theory via three primitive concepts and five 
primitive propositions. In Russell's wider sense, the three concepts 
and five propositions are the premisses, yet, strictly speaking, the 
only premisses are the five primitive propositions. However, in-
cluding the concepts (o, number and successor) amongst the pre-
misses is fairly innocuous since they are used in the statements of 
the propositional premisses as well as in the definition of further 
concepts used in subsequent results. In the next breakthrough in 
analysis, due to Frege, the concepts ceased to be primitive [e.g., he 
provided a definition of number). This wider sense of 'premisses' 
is typically employed in Russell's descriptions of philosophical 
analysis. 
ii) Analysis enlarges the domains of particular subjects. 
The current science or mathematics on which analysis is practised 
changes as the science itself evolves. What were formerly tentative 
premisses for science or mathematics later become a part of those dis-
ciplines. This view locates philosophy at the frontiers of the partic-
ular disciplines. As these frontiers are extended, territory that once 
belonged to philosophy becomes exact enough to be incorporated 
into those disciplines. Thus "every advance in knowledge robs phi -
losophy of some problems which formerly it had .... " (PLA, p. 243). 
So for Russellian analysis, yesterday's premisses become tomor-
row's results from which a new generation of philosophers will start 
the backwards journey of analysis. Thus, the philosophy/science 
distinction "is one, not in the subject matter, but in the state of mind 
of the investigator" (IMP, p. I ). It remains for philosophy to move to 
the new frontier. Hence, Russell's maxim that "science is what you 
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more or less know and philosophy is what you do not know" (PLA, 
p. 2431-
iii) Analysis leads to premisses that are decreasingly self-
evident. 
Russell made this point emphatically (LA, pp. 145-6) where he con-
siders the case of pure mathematics organized as a deductive system 
in which all of its propositions are deducible from a particular set of 
premisses. Russell points out that 
... . it becomes obvious that, if we are to believe in the truth of pure math· 
ematics, it cannot be solely because we believe in the truth of the set of 
premisses. Some of the premisses are much less obvious than some of their 
consequences, and are believed chiefly because of their consequencesJ 
He argues that this is always so when a science is arranged as a 
deductive system. So the logically simplest propositions of the sys-
tem are never the most obvious in physics either. For example, tak-
ing Maxwell's equations as the premisses of electrodynamics, these 
equations are far from obvious and " ... are believed because of the 
observed truth of certain of their logical consequences" (LA, p. 146). 
Hence, in general, philosophical analysis gives us grounds "for be-
lieving the premisses because true consequences follow from them, 
than for believing the consequences because they follow from the 
premisses" (PM, vol r, p. v). An example of the premisses being far 
from self-evident is provided by Russell's definition of number. A 
"number is anything which is the number of some class", where the 
"number of a class is the class of all those classes that are similar to 
it" (IMP, pp. r8-r9) is clearly a less self-evident definition than "a 
number is any of 1,2,3,4 .... etc". 
The decreasing self-evidence of the premisses has ontological im-
plications. According to Russell the current premisses provide our 
best guide to the nature of the most fundamental entities, hence, e.g., 
his replacement of common sense physical objects by sense-data and 
events. The decreasing self-evidence of the premisses was also the 
basis of Russell's vintage statement that "the point of philosophy is 
3 This point appears to have made little impact on Russell commentators. An excep-
tion is Irvine (1989) and Godwyn and Irvine in this volume. 
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to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and 
to end up with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it" 
(PLA, p. 172). This decreasing self-evidence of the premisses, coupled 
with the earlier claim that there may be alternative premisses from 
which the same given set of results is deducible, is the basis of Rus-
sell's characteristic open-mindedness about the finality or otherwise 
of his philosophical views at any given stage. 
Since the decreasing self-evidence of the premisses is the feature of 
Russellian analysis that is most at odds with some common interpre-
tations of Russell's work, it will pay us to consider it in more detail. 
The following table catalogues the multitude of ways that Russell 
describes the results and premisses in his accounts of analysis: 
Characteristics of Russellian Results and Premisses4 






























At first sight it may appear puzzling that though the results (as 
compared with the premisses) are "self-evident", "undeniable", and 
4 The sources for £hese characteristics include OKEW, PLA, LA, RTC, HWP, and 
MPD. For full details of all of the sources and the relevant quotations that span fifty 
five years, see Hager (1994, Chapter 3). The characteristics shown in brackets are 
implied by what Russell says whereas the others are direct quotations. 
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"indubitable", they are also "inexact", "vague", and "confused". 
Russell produces some striking examples to show that there is no 
inconsistency here: the something approaching us through a thick 
fog is undeniably (indubitably) some object or other though we have 
only a vague (confused, inexact) idea of just what it is (MPD, pp. 
98-99); likewise, the novice hearing a symphony might be impressed 
by the parts evidently (indubitably) forming a whole, yet be very 
vague (confused) about how the parts relate to one another to con-
stitute the whole (MPD, pp. r69-70). 
The characteristics of results and premisses listed in the table 
clarify an ambiguity in Russell's use of 'simple'. The premisses are 
simple in the primary sense that the results can be compounded 
from them. However, as the Oxford dictionary confirms, 'simple' 
also means 'easily understood', i.e., the results could also be seen 
as simple in that they are concrete, common knowledge, obvious, 
and indubitable. Russell appears to have been using the term in this 
second sense when he said that "the point of philosophy is to start 
with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end 
up with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it" (PLA, 
p. 172). 
However, there is an even more fundamental reason why there is 
confusion about simples in Russell's philosophy. It stems, I believe, 
from another ambiguity - this time in what Russell means by 'anal-
ysis'. It has been pointed out already that, on one understanding of 
the term, analysis refers only to the first, and more philosophical, 
stage of Russell's method. The second, more mathematical or logical, 
stage is, of course, synthesis. However, on the other understanding, 
analysis is the name of Russell's entire philosophical method. Let me 
call the former understanding the narrow interpretation of analysis, 
and the latter the broad interpretation. I suggest that the confusion 
resulting from these two meanings of 'analysis' has led people to 
concentrate on the first stage of Russell's philosophical method and 
treat that as all there is to it. What is left out makes all the difference 
about how one treats relations in Russell's philosophy (Hager 1994, 
Chs. 5-7). 
Russell's work is, of course, replete with examples of philosophi-
cal analysis that exemplify the scheme that has been detailed so far 
in this chapter. These include the overall program of Principia Matb-
ematica as well as the specific analyses that make up that program, 
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such as the analyis of classes; points and instants analysed as events; 
everyday objects such as tables and chairs as logical constructions; 
the theory of definite descriptions, and many others.> 
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AS A N EXAMPLE 
OF RUSSELLIAN ANALYSIS 
Judging by the frequency with which they are referred to and dis-
cussed, it appears that Russell's works prior to the 1920s, such as 
Principles of Mathematics, Principia Matbematica, 'Philosophy of 
Logical Atomism', the theory of descriptions, etc., have made the 
greatest impact on philosophers. By comparison, later works, though 
substantial, have been somewhat ignored. The general belief seems 
to be that Russell, having set much of the philosophical agenda up 
to 1920, was ovenaken by events as philosophy moved on, leaving 
him in isolation to produce unpopular theories, such as his neutral 
monism, which were thought to have little connection with his ear-
lier work. I have argued in detail that, on the contrary, all of Russell's 
work in philosophy displays striking continuity (Hager 1994). In this 
section, the 1948 Human Knowledge will be examined in some detail 
as an example of Russellian philosophical analysis. Other substan-
tial later works such as Analysis of Mind (1921), Analysis of Matter 
(1927), and An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940) could equally 
well have been considered. 
In some ways Human Knowledge is a followup to Analysis of 
Matter, a book which set out a philosophical analysis of physics 
focused on ontology. It sought to answer the following questions: 
What are the ultimate existents in terms of which physics is true (assuming 
that there are such)? And what is their general structure? And what are the 
relations of space-time, causality, and qualitative series respectively? (AMa, 
p. 9) 
The outcome of this analysis was that an ontology of events and uni-
versals would suffice for physics (Hager 1994, pp. 59- 60). However, 
in 1943, Russell noted that the 
.. . canons of scientific inference have never yet been formulated; if I have 
leisure, I hope to try to formulate them myself. (RTC, p. 718) 
5 See Hager (1994) for detaUed discussion and further examples. 
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This work became the 1948 Human Knowledge the "central pur-
pose" of which "is to examine the relation between individual 
experience and the general body of scientific knowledge" (HK, p. 9). 
Russell assumes scientific knowledge to be broadly and most likely 
true, and he seeks to investigate what principles need to supple-
ment our empirical experience if that assumption is valid. Hence, 
"one of the main purposes of this book" is to "discover the mini-
mum principles required to justify scientific inferences" (HK, p. r I). 
Thus, Russell's prime target for philosophical analysis is the nature 
of scientific inference. I will describe Russell's procedure in Human 
Knowledge as an instance of his two-directional method of philo-
sophical analysis. 
As we have seen, Russellian philosophical analysis begins with 
the 'results' or 'data' which are 'vague', 'common knowledge', 'in-
exact and approximate', 'indubitable', and 'puzzling'. The 'result' to 
be analysed in Human Knowledge is the 'vague' claim that 'scien-
tific knowledge is developed from observational data via inductive 
or probabilistic inference'. It is because of the vagueness and inex-
actness of the various terms in this claim that Russell spends a lot 
of space in Human Knowledge clarifying the 'results' or 'data' for 
the analysis. Thus, Part I (in a six part book) outlines the general 
body of scientific knowledge that he takes to be generally and most 
likely true. So Part I covers "what do we know?" (HK, p. 66). Part II, 
"still concerned with preliminaries" (HI<, p. u ), clarifies meanings 
of central fundamental terms like 'fact' and 'truth' and examines the 
relation of sensible experience to empirical concepts. In brief, Part II 
deals with "how do we know it?" At last, in Part III, "we begin out 
main inquiry" but "are not yet concerned to justify inferences, or to 
investigate the principles according to which they are made" (HK, pp. 
11-12). The main focus of Part III is 'how does what we know relate 
to our empirical data?' This is still part of the clarification of vague 
and inexact 'results'. After a detailed consideration of what can be 
counted as empirical data, Russell finds "that inferences (as opposed 
to logical constructions out of data) are necessary tO science" (HK, 
p. u). The conclusion to Part ill is that 
while mental events and their qualities can be known without inference, 
physical events are known only as regards their space-time structure. The 
qualities that compose such events are unknown - so completely unknown 
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that we cannot say either that they are, or that they are not, different from 
the qualities that we know as belonging to mental events. (HK, p. 247) 
Having clarified considerably in the first half of Human Knowl-
edge the 'vague' claim that 'scientific knowledge is developed from 
observational data via inductive or probabilistic inference', Russell 
is ready in Part TV to conduct the backwards step in analysis to iden-
tify some premisses of scientific inference. Recall that as against the 
'results', the 'premisses' are 'precise', 'logically independent', 'less 
obvious', 'definite', and 'dubitable'. In this case the premisses that he 
reaches in Part TV include fundamental concepts like ' causal line' (de-
fined on p. 477L 'space-time structure' (defined on pp. 344ffL 'event' 
(defined on pp. 97-8L and other basic notions such as 'similarity' 
and 'series'. The first two of these are particularly central to the 
analysis: 
Throughout [Part IV] the two concepts of space-time structure and causal 
chains (causal lines) assume a gradually increasing importance. (HK, p. 12) 
Russell continues the backwards search for premisses in Part V. 
Because "scientific inferences, as a rule, only confer probability on 
their conclusions" (HK, p. I2), it is crucial to clarify the different 
types of probability and their roles in scientific inference. Russell 
distinguishes the mathematical theory of probability from the dif-
ferent notion of probability that he calls "degree of credibility". The 
latter is derived from Keynes' work on probability and refers to propo-
sitions that have a finite degree of probability, but not one that can 
be quantified. Finally, in Part VI, Russell is ready for the forwards 
(or synthesis) step in the analysis. From the concepts and principles 
arrived at in the previous two sections, he proceeds to deduce "five 
postulates" which are "required to validate scientific method" (HK, 
p. 506). These 'reconstructed results', which replace the earlier vague 
notion of 'inductive or probabilistic inference' are: 
I) The postulate of quasi-permanence 
II) The postulate of separable causal lines 
ill) The postulate of spatia-temporal continuity in causal lines 
TV) The postulate of the common causal origin of similar struc-
tures ranged about a centre, or, more simply, the structural 
postulate 
V) The postulate of analogy 
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None of these postulates is certain, but each has some significant 
degree of probability. As Russell sees it: 
Given a number of propositions, each having a fairly high degree of intrin-
sic credibility, and given a system of inferences by virtue of which these 
various propositions increase each other's credibility, ..... lwei arrive at a 
body of interconnected propositions having, as a whole, a very high degree 
of credibility. (HK, p. 413) 
As usual, Russell recognises the non-finality of his analysis. Point-
ing out that it is "highly probable" that the number of postulates 
"can be further reduced", he adds that "I have not myself succeeded 
in doing so" IHK, p. 506). This characteristic recognition of the tenta-
tive findings of his philosophical analysis is reflected in a concluding 
comment: 
Induction, we have seen, is not quite the universal proposition that we need 
to justify scientific inference. But we most certainly do need some univer-
sal proposition or propositions, whether the five canons ..... or something 
different. (HK, p. 5 24) 
LATER WRITINGS ON ANA LYSIS 
When Russell published Human Knowledge, he was feeling increas-
ingly isolated in the British philosophical world as the influence of 
the later Wittgenstein grew stronger. This led him to provide search-
ing reviews and responses to the writings of a number of emerging 
philosophical opponents.6 In this section l will discuss Russell's re-
view of Urmson's book Philosophical Analysis !reprinted in MPD, 
it originally appeared in the Hibbert Journal in 1956), an article by 
McKinney in reply to Russell's review !which appeared in the suc-
ceeding volume of the Hibbert Journal), and a letter from Russell to 
McKinney commenting on his article in reply.? The reason for con-
sidering these three documents here is that, not only do they serve to 
show Russell's continuing commitment to the method of philosoph-
ical analysis outlined earlier in this chapter, but they also clarify a 
number of aspects of that method that have not been discussed so 
far. 
6 Four of these reviews/responses were later reprinted as Chapter r8 o£ My Philosoph-
ical Development. 
7 I am grateful LO Nicholas Griffin for bringing this letter to my attention. 
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In his review Russell finds that some of Urmson's comments on 
philosophical analysis are due to misunderstandings and some to 
philosophical disagreements. In an attempt to clear away the for-
mer, Russell undertakes to "try to state as concisely as I can the 
purposes and methods which have guided my work in philosophy" 
(MPD, p. r6r). To that end, Russell characterises his method of philo-
sophical analysis (MPD, p. r62). Within the subsequent discussion, 
clear reference can be found to each of the three important features 
of analysis outlined earlier in this chapter: 
(i) ANALYSIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE FINAL 
Earlier, two senses in which analysis is never final were noted. Re-
garding the first of these, Russell responds to Urmson's criticism 
that "however far you may carry your analysis you will never reach 
simples" (MPD, p. 164). Russell replies that even when he and 
Wittgenstein spoke of 'atomic facts' as the final residue of analy-
sis, it was "never an essential part of the analytic philosophy which 
Mr. Urmson is criticising to suppose that such facts were attainable" 
(MPD, p. r 64). Russell's standard position has been that he can see no 
reason either to assert or deny that simples can be reached by anal-
ysis. He repeats verbatim some discussion from the 1918 lectures 
'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' to show his long commitment 
to this position, adding that since then he has become even more 
convinced that there is no reason to expect analysis to reach simples. 
Russell then uses the example of the human skeleton to illustrate 
the point that no error will flow from taking complex objects to be 
simple at one level of analysis, as long as it is not assumed that such 
objects are incapable of further analysis. The skeleton is composed 
of bones, cells, molecules, atoms, electrons, etc. 
Bones, molecules, atoms, and electrons may each be treated, for certain pur-
poses, as if they were unanalysable units devoid of structure, but at no stage 
is there any positive reason to suppose that this is in fact the case. The ul-
timate units so far reached may at any moment turn out to be capable of 
analysis. Whether there must be units incapable of analysis because they are 
destitute of parts, is a question which there seems no way of deciding. Nor 
is it important, si nce there is nothing erroneous in an account of structure 
which starts from units that are afterwards found to be themselves complex. 
(MPD, p. r6s). 
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Regarding the second point, that alternative sets of premisses are 
always a possibility, Russell spells out reasons why i t is important 
for philosophy to devise alternative sets of premisses. 
Any reduction in the number of undefined terms and unproved premisses is 
an improvement since it diminishes the range of possible error and provides 
a smaller assemblage of hostages for the truth of the whole system. IMPD, 
p . 162) 
The successive historical stages in the analysis of mathematics are 
then outlined by Russell to illustrate this point. 
ii) Analysis enlarges the domains of particular subjects. 
As discussed earlier, the current science or mathematics on which 
analysis is practised changes as the subject itself evolves. Formerly 
tentative premisses for science or mathematics later become a part 
of those disciplines. This aspect of analysis is raised indirectly in 
Urmson's objection to analysis that "the collection of statements 
t!hat you reach by analysing is not equivalent to the original unanal-
ysed statement" IMPD, p. r64) and in Russell's reply to this objection. 
Perhaps confusing Russell with a logical positivist, Urmson takes it 
as obvious that for analysis to be any good, the premisses reached by 
analysis must be logically equivalent to the results from which the 
analysis started. Thus, his criticism of analysis is that when a com-
plex statement like "England declared war in 1939" is analysed into a 
series of simpler statements, the two will not be equivalent. Now the 
problem here is that Russell never maintained logical equivalence 
between results and premisses, only that what was well founded in 
the results can be deduced from the premisses; i.e., the synthesis 
step in philosophical analysis leads to a reconstructed version of the 
results. Thus, for example, replacing the desk of common sense by a 
complex structure of sense-data involves not only some continuity 
but also some novelty. No wonder, then, that Russell was unsure of 
what was Urmson's exact point here. 
As noted earlier, for Russell this creation of new premisses that 
imply a reconstruction of the results is precisely the way that knowl-
edge advances. Russell charges that had Urmson's approach to phi-
losophy, rooted in ordinary language, flourished in the Greek world, 
science m ight still be at the stage of earth, air, fire, and water as the 
four 'elements' !MPD, p. 169). 
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iii) Analysis leads to premisses that are decreasingly self-
evident. 
In explaining his method of philosophical analysis in the Urmson 
review, Russell refers to the minimum of undefined terms and un-
proved premisses that is achieved by the analysis step. But he goes 
on to point out that "such a minimum, when arrived at, does not 
give the reasons for which we believe the system to be true" (MPD, 
p. r63). Generally, then, the premisses are less self-evident than the 
results. This point is connected by Russell with the "intolerable pro-
lixity" of a perfect logical language [MPD, p. 166). Such languages, 
with their characteristics of simplicity and abstractness are useful 
in moving in the backwards direction of analysis. However, when 
moving the other way to synthesis, more everyday language is better 
suited to the task. Given Russell's account of the historical move-
ment of analysis through successive generations of thinkers, it seems 
that he would need to argue that one generation's technical language 
will become a later generation's everyday language. 
It is clear, then, that in his r 9 56 review of the Unnson book, 
Russell provided a detailed account of his method of philosophical 
analysis that in all key details was the same as the method he was 
developing and expounding in the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury. Russell's Urmson review stimulated a response from McKinney 
( 1957) that sought to explicate further the nature of analysis. Its chief 
interest today is in its conflation of Russell's method of analysis with 
scientific method, an error that Russell focused on in his subsequent 
letter to McKinney (Russell 1958). 
The McKinney article shows an awareness of the two-directional 
nature of Russellian analysis. But McKinney equates the first stage 
[analysis) with scientific hypothesis formation. He thinks of the sec-
ond stage (synthesis) as akin to deduction from scientific laws and 
theories. Russell's 1958 letter bluntly rejects this interpretation by 
distinguishing sharply between "analysis" (logical analysis) and in-
ference to things not perceived, i.e., scientific hypothesis, or non-
deductive or nondemonstrative inference. He adds that this contrast 
between the methods of philosophy and of science should be clear 
from Human Knowledge. Russell expands on the difference in the 
letter by arguing that while in philosophical analysis the "whole is 
given 11, in scientific hypothesising the "whole is not given 11 • Russell's 
aim in making this contrast is to emphasise that the data or re-
sults that are the starting point for philosophical analysis are very 
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different from the data that play a central part in scientific method. 
By the "whole being given" in philosophical analysis, Russell means 
that there is no question of the data being expanded indefinitely, 
as happens in science, as further observations are made or experi-
ments conducted. Since philosophical analysis is a conceptual activ-
ity, all that is needed is an understanding of the present state of the 
field being investigated. This special feature of the data for philo-
sophical analysis, that it is already freely available, is reflected in 
some of the kinds of characteristics of 'results' or 'data' noted ear-
lier in this chapter, i.e., 'relatively concrete', 'common knowledge', 
'more obvious', 'undeniable', 'indubitable' and 'self-evident', while 
also 'inexact and approximate', 'confused' and 'ambiguous'. In con-
trast, Russell views scientific hypothesising as essentially dependent 
on testing by observational data, data that by its nature is always 
incomplete. In scientific hypothesising, the "whole is not given" be-
cause inference to unobserved instances is an unavoidable part of the 
enterprise. 
Russell provides some illustrative examples of what he sees as the 
perennial incompleteness in the data in scientific hypothesising. An 
example discussed in both Human Knowledge and in the letter to 
McKinney is the inference to Kepler's laws from data consisting of a 
finite set of planetary positions. Clearly, the data here is less than the 
whole in that it consists of particular positions for particular planets 
at particular times, a subset of all of the positions of all of the plan-
ets at all times. In this case, there is the further complication that 
while two of the three positional coordinates come from measure-
ments, the third cooordinate is a guess chosen to yield simple laws of 
planetary motion. Russell points out that it follows from scientific 
hypothesising being based on less than the whole data, that scientific 
hypotheses can never be proved true: 
The hypothesis embodied in Kepler's laws is not proved by observation; what 
observation proves is that the facts are compatible with this hypothesis. (H K, 
p. 499) 
Another example that Russell discussed in Human Knowledge 
is the law of falling bodies (p. 497). Based on a small number of 
rough measurements, Galileo hypothesised that the acceleration of 
vertically falling bodies is approximately constant. Further support 
for the hypothesis was added when the invention of the air pump 
enabled measurements in the absence of air resistance. However, 
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later observations and theoretical developments suggested slight 
variations in acceleration with both latitude and altitude. Thus, 
Galileo's simple hypothesis was displaced successively by increas-
ingly more complicated Newtonian and then Einsteinian laws. 
Russell's view of the roles of observation and hypothesis in sci-
ence, as illustrated in these examples, is well captured in the follow-
ing quotation in which he offers a "model of the scientific method": 
Hypothesis and observation alternate; each new hypothesis calls for new 
observations, and, if it is to be accepted, must fit the facts better than any 
previous hypothesis. But it always remains possible, if not probable, that 
some further hypothesis may be called for to explain further observations. 
New hypotheses do not show old ones to have been false, but only to have 
been approximations .. . . (Rt•sselli974, pp. 2.1-2.) 
Readers will have noticed that Russell's characterisation of scien-
tific method in the preceding paragraphs bears a strong resemblance 
to Popper's fallibilism. 8 
By now Russell's sharp contrast between his distinctive method 
of philosophical analysis and his view of the scientific method, with 
its alternations of hypothesising and observation, should be clear. 
However, it is unsurprising that McKinney and others might con-
fuse the two for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was not unknown for 
Russell to refer to his method of philosophical analysis as a 'scientific 
method in philosophy' or as a 'method of scientific philosophising' 
[see, e.g., OKEW). Secondly, as was shown earlier in this chapter, 
Russell saw the frontiers between science and philosophy as some-
what blurred. This might have been taken to suggest that he viewed 
their methods as blurred as well, had not the discussion of the last 
few pages shown any such inference to be erroneous. 
A third reason why Russell's method of philosophical analysis 
might be confused with scientific method is his frequent use of cer-
tain examples as illustrations of particular points about analysis. 
For instance, whenever he is discussing the non-finality of analy-
sis, Russell often uses examples like water [e.g., MPD, pp. 169- 70). 
His point is that when you learn that water is two parts hydrogen 
and one part oxygen, you do not cease thereby to know anything 
that you previously knew about water. While this type of example 
may be useful for making particular points about analysis, it should 
8 Russell's fallibilist understanding of science has not received much attention. For 
more on Russell's philosophy of science, see Hager (zooo). 
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not be inferred that the analysis of water into hydrogen and oxygen 
was inspired by Russell's method of philosophical analysis. Rather, 
that feat was achieved by quite other means. Interestingly, while 
strongly influenced by G.E. Moore in the early years of his revolt 
against idealism, Russell had regarded analysis of propositions as 
akin to chemical decomposition. This line of thought can be found 
in W.E. Johnson, Husser!, Meinong, and other writers of that era. 
However, in Russell's case, rapid advances in his philosophical po-
sition, such as the theory of descriptions, quickly disposed of any 
lingering tendency to entertain a naive realist view of propositions. 
McKinney based his paper on Russell's Urmson review and on 
Human Knowledge. It should be clear from the previous section of 
this chapter that Human Knowledge used Russellian philosophical 
analysis to propose tentatively five postulates of scientific method. 
That is, the premisses of scientific method were the object of the 
analysis, but the analysis itself was very clearly not an instance of 
scientific method. 
In the letter to McKinney, Russell also denied that his "construc-
tion of the external world" was an exercise in philosophical analysis. 
This might seem puzzling until we realise that in wanting to remove 
confusions between scientific and philosophical analysis, Russell 
would avoid a description that made it sound like philosophy alone 
did all of the work. Certainly that is the impression that "Russell's 
construction of the external world" conveys. In fact, Russell took sci-
ence to be broadly correct in its account of the world and sought to 
reconcile the philosophy and psycho1ogy of perception with this. So 
his constmction was a philosophical analysis heavily supplemented 
by the contributions of scientific method. Rather than developing a 
grand system of the world, his philosophical construction was some-
what more modest. A more accurate title would be something like 
"Russell's construction of a way of reconciling what we know of 
human perception with the external world portrayed by science". 
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN RUSSELLIAN ANALYSIS 
Despite Russell's method of analysis, as set out above, being fairly 
explicit in his writings, it is still not well understood. Major critical 
works that have sought to engage significantly with Russell's phi-
losophy (e.g., Jager 1972, Pears 1967, Eames 1969), have been limited 
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by insufficient treatment of his refined philosophical method. This 
trend is continued in the first volume ( r 996a) of Monk's long-awaited 
biography of Russell. Though he covers the years up to 1921 Monk 
provides only cursory mentions of analysis, viewing it as an iso-
lated philosophical conundrum about parts and wholes that engaged 
Russell in the early years of his revolt against idealism. Without more 
attention to the details of Russell's method of analysis and its central 
role in his work, no biography could hope to delve very deeply into 
his philosophy. 
The main reason why Russell's philosophical method is absent 
from Monk's account is that he misunderstands the important role of 
language in Russell's work. As Russell's preferred terminology for de-
scribing analysis (such as 'premisses', 'conclusions' (or 'results') that 
are 'deducible' from the premisses, and so on) makes clear, proposi-
tions and their associated linguistic forms are important in analysis. 
However, this central role of language in Russellian analysis does not 
mean that philosophy ends at analysis of language. Thus, although 
analysis is primarily analysis of propositions (language), it is carried 
out for purposes other than the analysis of propositions. 
This means that Russellian analysis is primarily analysis of propo-
sitions and only indirectly is it analysis of objects. So, in his famous 
analysis of the desk (PLA, p. 236ff), it is not the desk that is analysed, 
but rather propositions about the desk. This analysis of common 
sense propositions about the desk leads to a set of basic premisses 
from which is synthesised a set of propositions which captures the 
truths embodied in the initial common sense propositions, yet avoids 
their shortcomings such as vagueness, ambiguity, etc. These anal-
ysed results are substituted for the initial unanalysed results about 
the desk. This completes the primary part of the Russellian analysis 
of the desk, i.e., the analysis of propositions. 
The sense in which the desk as an ontological object is analysed 
is quite different. Russell's view is emphatically not one that has the 
physical desk of the metaphysics of common sense analysed into 
smaller parts and then resynthesised (say) as a swarm of sub-atomic 
particles (PLA, p. 161). (Though, of course, Russell claims all along 
that his theories are compatible with those of physics as realistically 
understood.) Instead ontological analysis is an indirect outcome of 
tthe analysis of propositions. The desk of the metaphysics of com-
mon sense is inferred uncritically from the initial set of common 
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sense propositions. Since, as we have seen, a set of analysed results 
is substituted for the common sense propositions, and since, in ad-
dition, the desk of common sense cannot be logically inferred from 
the refined, substitute set of propositions, it follows that the exis-
tence of the supposed desk of common sense cannot be established. 
Instead, the analysed results invite inference to a somewhat different 
ontological object- a complex structure of sensa or events. 
Monk's work misses the centrality of analysis in Russell's philos-
ophy because he misunderstands the important role of language in 
this philosophy. As Monk sees it, through 
all the various transformations of Russell's philosophical doctrines, one 
thing remained quite constant, and that was the conviction that, whatever 
i.t is the philosopher is concerned with, it is precisely not language. (Monk 
1996b, p. 4)9 
As we have just seen, in an important sense, for Russell, philos-
ophy is concerned with language. However, as we have also seen, 
this in no way signals that Russell thought that language was the 
prime object of study for philosophy. Rather, it recognises his im-
portant position that language is inescapably the medium through 
which philosophical analysis engages with matters that are nonlin-
guistic.10 
A major contributing factor to Monk's overl.ooking these funda-
mental points about Russell's work is his fondness for stark opposites 
when characterising differences between philosophical positions. In 
critiquing Oummett's claim that what distinguishes analytical phi-
losophy is its claim that "philosophy of language" is "the foundation 
9 If Russell's philosophical concern really was "pre.cisely not language", it would 
be surprising that "language" features so prominently in his works, e.g. Part ll of 
Human Knowledge is titled "Language", key chapters in Part TV are "Minimum 
Vocabularies" and "Structure and Minimum Vocabularies". Similar examples can 
be found in other major works, such as An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. 
1° For a perceptive account of this point see Kung (r967). Monk mistakenly concludes 
from Russell's characterisation of some instances of the 'linguistic' as ' trivial' that 
he thereby regards all ' linguistic' items as "trivial and beneath consideration" 
(1996b, p. 6). In fact the instances that Monk mentions are ones where the terms 
which initially interested Russell, such as numbers, turned out to be be fully defin-
able via other terms. Thus, he came to view propositions about numbers as mere 
verbal conveniences of no interest to philosophical analysis. However, Russell's 
philosophical analyses typically centre on more robust terms that appear not to 
be definable in this way. For Russell, such linguistic items are far from trivial. An 
example is the term 'similar' (see Hager 1994, pp. rr6-7). 
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of all other philosophy", Monk rightly objects against Dummett that 
this excludes Russell. However, in seeking to rescue Russell's cre-
dentials as an analytical philosopher, Monk portrays him as taking a 
"precisely opposite" tack of excluding language from the philosoph-
ical agenda. Monk suggests that what really distinguishes analytical 
philosophy is analysis itself: 
It is this notion of a complex-and the concomitant notion that to understand 
a complex is to analyse it, to break it down into the simples that compose 
it- that lies at the heart of ana lytical philosophy. (Monk 1996b, p. r2) 
He has Russell committed to a non-linguistic interpretation of 
analysis in which it is applied to complex objects. 11 Thus, having 
rejected two earlier attempts to characterise 'analytical philosophy' 
in terms of its supposed opposite, 'analytical vs continental' and 'an-
alytical vs phenomenological' (Dummett's position], Monk proposes 
that the correct opposition is 'analytical vs Wittgensteinian'. Monk 
then quotes with approval, and at length, Wittgenstein's attack on 
this conception of analysis with which Russell has been saddled by 
Monk. According to Monk, Wittgenstein's rejection of analysis cen-
tres on the claim that it would be odd to substitute "Bring me the 
broomstick and the brush which is fitted on to it" for "Bring me 
the broom". We can all agree with Wittgenstein's point here. But 
this has as little to do with Russell's conception of analysis as did 
Urmson's argument, discussed above, about "England declared war 
in 1939" not being equivalent to a series of simpler statements. Quite 
simply, Urmson's 19 56 misunderstandings of Russellian analysis are 
repeated in I 996 by Monk. 
On Monk's misunderstanding of Russellian analysis, Russell anal-
yses the desk, for example, into legs, top, sides, etc. Rather, as already 
demonstrated, Russellian analysis is analysis of propositions about 
the desk and only indirectly is it analysis of the desk. The result is 
that, as shown above, rather than analysing the common sense phys-
ical desk into its parts, what Russellian analysis does is to suggest 
its replacement by a quite different ontological object. This is true of 
'' Perhaps Monk has fallen into the trap, discussed in the previous section, of taking 
too literally Russell's use of examples like the analysis of water into hydrogen and 
oxygen as examples of analysis. Such examples may be useful for making partic-
ular points about analysis, but should not be taken as examples of philosophical 
analysis. 
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all of the paradigmatic examples of Russellian analysis- the defini-
tion of number, definite descriptions, the analysis of classes, the anal-
ysis of cardinal numbers, etc. I am unaware of any instance of Rus-
sellian analysis that squares with Monk's account. No wonder that 
Monk is dimly aware that his position might face some difficulties: 
... Russell is sometimes regarded as having forgotten - or perhaps misun-
derstood - the nature uf his own philosophical achievements. For isn't his 
theory of descriptions, for example, a 'paradigm of philosophy' precisely 
because it demonstrates the value of linguistic analysis in philosophy, of 
demonstrating that philosophical clarity can be achieved through the analy-
sis of sentences? It is true, of course, that this is how this theory- and much 
else in Russell's work- has been absorbed in 'the literature', but we should, 
I think, not lose sight of the fact that this is not, and never was, how Russell 
himself understood the matter. (Monk 1996b, pp. 4-5) 
On the contrary, [ take it that enough has been said in this chapter 
to show that, prima facie, any misunderstandings on these matters 
are entirely Monk's. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to provide a brief account of Russell's cru-
cial but little appreciated method of analysis. Major characteristics of 
the method of philosophical analysis have been described. It has been 
argued that this method underpins Russell's best known contribu-
tions to philosophy. Then, because his later work has been rather ne-
glected, some of this work was discussed in detail to show that it ex-
emplified the same overall philosophical method. This procedure has 
had the effect of emphasising the unity and continuity of Russell's 
philosophy, as well as clearing up a number of common miscon-
ceptions, in particular the relationship of philosophical analysis to 
scientific method. However, as the discussion of Monk's erroneous 
interpretation has shown, there is a long way to go before Russell's 
distinctive contribution to philosophy will be properly appreciated. 
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